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I. INTRODUCTION 
In an environment in which corporate officials complain to Congress 
about the existence of patent “trolls,”1 perhaps it should not come as a sur-
prise that patent law reform proposals are finding a receptive audience. 
Major reports on the patent system compiled by the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC)2 and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)3 advocate a 
number of reforms touching on both the administrative processes of the 
patent system and the treatment of patent rights in the courts. While the 
                                                                                                                                                
 ©  2004 Mark D. Janis 
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 1. See Patent Quality Improvement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 198th Cong. 21 
(2003) [hereinafter Patent Quality Improvement Hearings] (testimony of David Simon) 
(defining patent trolls as “patent system bottom feeders” who buy “improvidently-granted 
patents from distressed companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate businesses”).  
 2. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 3.  NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. 
Merrill et al. eds., forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter NAS STUDY], available at http://www.-
nap.edu/books/0309089107.html. 
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reform proposals are not particularly notable for their originality,4 they are 
presented with a tone of urgency that has not been heard for some years. 
The FTC Report identifies patent litigation as one area in need of scru-
tiny and selects the presumption of patent validity5 in patent litigation as a 
particular target for reform. According to the FTC Report, the existence of 
the presumption is “not objectionable” because the patent challenger 
should bear the burden of overcoming the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice’s (USPTO) determination of patentability.6 The Report’s objections 
focus on the standard of evidence for overcoming the presumption, and 
here, the FTC can discern “no persuasive reason” why the existing clear 
and convincing evidence standard should be retained.7 Instead, patent 
challengers should be able to overcome the presumption of validity by 
evidence that meets the preponderance standard, according to the Report.8  
In one respect, it is not surprising that the FTC has focused on the pre-
sumption of patent validity. The presumption is an easy target; it enhances 
the leverage of the patent trolls.9 However, in another respect, the new fo-
cus on the presumption of validity may seem startling, at least to those 
within the patent community. The Federal Circuit’s pronouncements on 
the presumption of validity have become routine. In dozens of decisions, 
the Federal Circuit has repeated core principles: the patent challenger 
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on patent invalidity;10 to carry this 
burden, the patent challenger must establish relevant facts by clear and 
convincing evidence;11 clear and convincing evidence is “evidence which 
                                                                                                                                                
 4. Most of the proposals are eerily familiar, having been proposed—and 
discarded—in previous episodes of patent law reform stretching back to the 19th 
Century. I have previously commented on the reiterative nature of patent law reform. 
Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899 (2002). 
 5. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (providing in relevant part that, “A patent shall be 
presumed valid. Each claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the 
validity of other claims . . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any 
claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). 
 6. FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 28. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. According to David Simon, “These patent trolls have the presumption of validity 
on their side. It is difficult to convince a jury of patent invalidity in light of the 
heightened evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence.” Patent Improvement 
Quality Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (testimony of David Simon). 
 10. See, e.g., New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The presumption acts as a procedural device which places the burden 
of going forward with evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion of invalidity at trial 
on the alleged infringer.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (upholding summary judgment of invalidity for double patenting). 
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produces in the mind of the trier of fact an abiding conviction that the truth 
of the factual contentions is highly probable.”12  
This Article critically examines the FTC’s proposals concerning the 
presumption of validity. In Part II, I identify two general functions of pre-
sumptions in law, the expressive and instrumental functions. In Part III, I 
argue that the FTC’s proposal overlooks the expressive function of the 
presumption of patent validity and I consider the insights that might be 
gained from considering the expressive function. In Part IV, I analyze the 
FTC’s arguments touching on the instrumental function of the presump-
tion of validity, and conclude that they are plausible, but deserve refine-
ment and further probing. 
II. EXPRESSIVE AND INSTRUMENTAL FUNCTIONS OF 
PRESUMPTIONS 
The FTC Report’s proposal to reform the presumption of validity pro-
vokes some fundamental questions about patent validity adjudication. 
Most directly, the Report encourages the patent community to think more 
carefully about what the presumption of validity is designed to accom-
plish. We might answer the question by returning to first principles—by 
considering the functions that presumptions are generally designed to per-
form in law and evaluating the reform proposals in light of those func-
tions. 
The Supreme Court has provided a framework for understanding pre-
sumptions and standards of evidence for overcoming presumptions. In 
Addington v. Texas,13 a civil commitment case involving a debate over the 
applicability of the clear and convincing standard (as opposed to the be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard), the Court attributed two functions to 
standards of proof: (1) “to indicate the relative importance attached to the 
ultimate decision;”14 and (2) to allocate the risk of error between the liti-
gants.15 The first may be described as the “expressive” function and the 
second as an “instrumental” function. 
Evaluating a rule in light of its expressive function requires identifying 
the rule’s overlying message and assessing that message’s impact. Schol-
ars have recognized that many debates “over the appropriate content of 
law” are in some part “debates over the statement that law makes”—that 
                                                                                                                                                
 12. Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 13. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 14. Id. at 423. 
 15. Id. 
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is, debates over law’s expressive function.16 A legal rule might be expres-
sive in a weaker and a stronger sense. In the weaker sense, a rule may be 
purely symbolic, intended to accomplish nothing other than to make a 
statement, and it may succeed even if it is never actually enforced.17 In the 
stronger sense, a rule might be designed to provide a baseline for the even-
tual fashioning of new norms of behavior, without a tight connection be-
tween the rule and the behavior. The rule is designed to accomplish some-
thing other than merely to make a statement, but the statement is at least as 
important as the precise manner in which the rule is enforced.18 For exam-
ple, the presumption of innocence in criminal cases is emblematic of our 
paramount concern about individual freedom and our deeply-rooted dis-
trust of the power of the state. If the legislature proposed to “reform” the 
presumption of innocence, any thoughtful analysis of that proposal would 
need to consider how the proposal might alter the overlying message asso-
ciated with the presumption and the broad social consequences of that al-
teration. An analysis that considered only the projected effects on actual 
case outcomes would be incomplete. 
Evaluating a rule in light of its instrumental function requires assessing 
how the rule affects case outcomes. For example, in a criminal case, we 
might justify the strong presumption of innocence and its associated be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard by asserting that the overwhelming 
share of the risk of error (meaning an erroneous legal determination deriv-
ing from the found facts) should be allocated to the state.19 By contrast, in 
an ordinary civil case for damages, we might argue that no particular pre-
sumption is justified; the risk of error should be allocated equally among 
the parties, and thus application of a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard would be appropriate.20 If these respective classes of cases are con-
sidered to lie at opposite extremes of a spectrum, then there may be a class 
of intermediate cases that correlate with an intermediate standard. Civil 
cases may fall into this intermediate zone when the interests at stake are 
more important than loss of money, and in such cases, it would be inap-
propriate to allocate the risk of error equally. Thus, a moderate presump-
tion should apply coupled to an intermediate standard, such as the clear 
and convincing standard, for overcoming the presumption. Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                                
 16. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2051 (1996). 
 17. Id. at 2023 (asserting that a proscription against flag-burning is an example of a 
rule that is expressive in the weaker sense, in that the flag-burning rule is not necessarily 
designed with the expectation that it will deter potential flag-burners). 
 18. Id. at 2025-27. 
 19. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24 (making this argument). 
 20. Id. 
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an analysis of a legal presumption from an instrumental perspective takes 
the presumption as a tool for achieving precise outcomes and assesses 
whether the presumption facilitates those outcomes. 
We can understand the presumption of patent validity against this gen-
eral backdrop. The FTC Report’s proposed reforms to the presumption of 
validity should be considered in light of both the expressive and instru-
mental dimensions of the presumption. I take up that task in the remainder 
of this Article. 
III. EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF 
VALIDITY 
Consideration of law’s expressive function has significant implications 
for patent law, a point that I develop in more detail elsewhere.21 Evaluat-
ing the FTC Report’s reform proposals by considering the expressive 
function of the presumption of validity reveals three important insights. 
First, acknowledgment of the presumption’s expressive function reminds 
us that the fact that we have a presumption of patent validity is as signifi-
cant as the precise verbal formulation that we use for the standard of evi-
dence for overcoming the presumption. Second, while it may be easy 
enough to manipulate that verbal formulation, it may be a very different 
and very subtle exercise to control the overlying message that the pre-
sumption of patent validity delivers, especially outside the patent commu-
nity. Third, manipulating the verbal formulation without controlling the 
overlying message may yield some unpleasant surprises.  
In particular, “reforming” the words of the evidentiary standard with-
out controlling the overlying message may, ironically, result in changing 
everything while changing nothing. That is, one possible outcome of the 
proposed change to the preponderance standard for overcoming the pre-
sumption of patent validity is that the change will cause little difference in 
the outcomes of cases but, at least in the short term, those outside the pat-
ent community may perceive a dramatic change in the overlying message. 
Thus, judges will reach the same result that they would have reached un-
der the old standard, substituting the words of the new standard but the 
perception may be that patents are less secure and the patent system de-
serves less respect. 
The Supreme Court made a similar point in Addington. The Court ex-
pressed doubt about whether the choice of standard between clear and 
convincing and preponderance of the evidence would often make a differ-
ence in case outcomes, especially since it would be unwise to expect that 
                                                                                                                                                
 21. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law’s Expressive Quality (Working Paper, 2004). 
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fact finders, particularly lay juries, would be adept at understanding the 
nuanced differences between the standards.22 At the same time, the Court 
resisted the notion that adoption of a particular standard of proof was a 
mere “empty semantic exercise.”23 
To illustrate the point about the potential for divergence between the 
words of the evidentiary standard and the overlying message of the pre-
sumption of validity, I consider three sets of cases: (1) cases immediately 
preceding the creation of the Federal Circuit, compared to early Federal 
Circuit cases; (2) more recent Federal Circuit cases; and (3) trademark 
cases adopting the preponderance standard. 
A. Pre-Federal Circuit and Early Federal Circuit Cases on the 
Presumption of Validity 
The adoption of the clear and convincing standard is widely attributed 
to the Federal Circuit, as the FTC Report points out.24 The perception that 
the Federal Circuit enhanced the effect of the presumption of validity co-
incides with the generally received wisdom that the Federal Circuit 
adopted a pro-patent bias early in its tenure.25 In turn, this correlates with 
one of the FTC Report’s themes: that the balance between patent and 
competition policy has swung too far in favor of patents.26 
The actual story is more complex. Contrary to common perception, be-
fore the creation of the Federal Circuit, most appellate courts had already 
adopted the clear and convincing standard of evidence for overcoming the 
presumption of patent validity.27 Only the Sixth Circuit appeared to have 
                                                                                                                                                
 22. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424-25. 
 23. Id. at 425. 
 24. FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 26 n.183. 
 25. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 387, 399-401.  
 26. E.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 18-23. 
 27. It appears that the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all had adopted the clear and convincing standard. See, e.g., 2 
DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 5.06 n.84 (2003) (citing relevant authority). For 
representative language, see, for example., Manufactoring Research Corp. v. Graybar 
Elec. Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that the burden of establishing 
invalidity “is generally an onerous one” and requires the patent challenger to 
“demonstrate invalidity by clear and convincing evidence”), and Hobbs v. United States 
Atomic Energy Commission, 451 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[T]he presumption of 
patent validity may be rebutted only by a quantum of proof—whether it be called clear 
and convincing or beyond a reasonable doubt—which is greater than a mere 
preponderance.”). The Eighth Circuit followed a “substantial evidence” standard, but 
noted that “the proof which was considered adequate under the substantial evidence 
standard here would also suffice under the clear and convincing evidence test.” Clark 
Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 795 n.17 (8th Cir. 1978). 
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squarely adopted a preponderance standard, and the court still required 
clear and convincing evidence where the prior art at issue was oral testi-
mony of prior invention.28 Despite the Sixth Circuit’s adoption of the pre-
ponderance standard, the overlying message was that the patent system 
was “in distress,”29 and that the presumption of validity was meaning-
less.30 
Soon after the creation of the Federal Circuit, the court adopted the 
clear and convincing standard31—hardly a watershed event, considering 
that the clear and convincing standard was already the majority rule. In 
addition, the Federal Circuit also addressed whether the presumption ap-
plied to prior art that the USPTO never had considered. The court held that 
the presumption still applied to such art, but that the patent challenger’s 
burden was easier to discharge because the added burden of deference to 
the USPTO was absent.32 We might similarly suppose that this, too, was 
                                                                                                                                                
 28. See, e.g., Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1297 (6th Cir. 1975); see 
also Saginaw Prod. Corp. v. E. Airlines, Inc., 615 F.2d 1136, 1240 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(utilizing the preponderance standard).  
 29. Abe Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 810 (1971). 
 30. According to former Justice Fortas: 
Of course the law says that a properly issued patent is presumptively 
valid. But confronted by judicial hostility, this presumption is about as 
formidable as a silk screen against a machine gun. To many appellate 
judges, the presumption is something to acknowledge, and then to show 
that it’s not controlling. 
Id. at 810. To be sure, the fact that some courts were holding that the presumption of 
validity only applied to art that the USPTO had considered probably contributed to this 
message. 
 31. E.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). Indeed, in doing so, the Federal Circuit rejected a beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard, presumably an inappropriate standard for civil patent cases in the modern 
understanding, but still a formulation that enjoyed considerable support in older patent 
cases. See Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (discussing the issue and concluding that it was proper for the district court to 
instruct the jury that the clear and convincing standard applied to invalidity 
determinations). 
 32. According to Judge Rich in American Hoist: 
When no prior art other than that which was considered by the USPTO 
examiner is relied on by the attacker, he has the added burden of 
overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified government agency 
presumed to have properly done its job. . . . [¶] When an attacker, in 
sustaining the burden imposed by § 282, produces prior art or other 
evidence not considered in the USPTO, there is, however, no reason to 
defer to the USPTO so far as its effect on validity is concerned. . . . 
What the production of new prior art or other invalidating evidence not 
before the USPTO does is to eliminate, or at least reduce, the element 
930 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:923  
 
 
hardly a notable departure from pre-Federal Circuit law, because it seemed 
to leave courts free to act as they did prior to the establishment of the Fed-
eral Circuit: refusing to give the presumption of validity any real meaning 
in litigation involving newly-discovered prior art. 
Yet the tone of the Federal Circuit’s early opinions on the presumption 
of validity, in the context of other events then occurring in the patent sys-
tem,33 resulted in a very palpable change in the overlying message: the 
new message was that the Federal Circuit had “strengthened” the pre-
sumption of validity and had made it meaningful once again. The lesson 
here is important: there is no strict, inevitable correlation between the 
words of the evidentiary standard and the overlying message delivered by 
the presumption of validity. The message is independently significant for 
purposes of patent policy and, of course, for purposes of patent policy re-
form. 
B. Modern Federal Circuit Cases 
The Federal Circuit has never changed the words of the evidentiary 
standard for overcoming the presumption of patent validity. The court has 
instead repeated the standard in dozens, perhaps hundreds of opinions.34 
Yet it would be a mistake to assume that, because the words of the stan-
dard have remained constant throughout the Federal Circuit’s tenure, the 
message of the presumption of validity has likewise remained constant or 
that there is a tight connection between the words of the standard and spe-
cific case outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                
of deference due the USPTO, thereby partially, if not wholly, 
discharging the attacker’s burden, but neither shifting nor lightening it 
or changing the standard of proof. 
725 U.S. at 1359 (emphasis original). 
 33. Events such as the consolidation of power in the new court, the character and 
track record of the judges on the new court, and the command that the new court “unify” 
patent law. For more on the before and after story on the presumption of validity, see 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6, 18-21 (1989). 
 34. A few recent examples include: Elan Corp., PLC v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 366 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Patents are presumed to be valid, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 282 (2000), and an accused infringer challenging the validity of a patent under the on-
sale bar must demonstrate by ‘clear and convincing evidence . . . .’”); Golden Blount, Inc. 
v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“To establish 
invalidity, the supporting facts must be shown by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’”); 
Norian Corp. v. Striker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The jury was 
correctly instructed that a party seeking to invalidate a patent must do so by clear and 
convincing evidence.”).  
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The Federal Circuit’s cases contain isolated hints that the standard is 
reasonably fluid despite the court’s pro forma deployment of it. For exam-
ple, when it perceives a good case for invalidating claims, the Federal Cir-
cuit has been known to observe that “even under a ‘clear and convincing’ 
standard, proof need not be airtight.”35 The court has also held that the 
jury need not be instructed that the presumption of validity exists, so long 
as the jury is instructed that facts establishing invalidity must be tested by 
the clear and convincing standard.36  
The Federal Circuit’s Rochester opinion illustrates the fluidity of the 
clear and convincing standard.37 The claims concerned methods to inhibit 
the activity of the human COX-2 enzyme (implicated in arthritis) by ad-
ministering a compound that “selectively inhibits activity of the [COX-2] 
gene product.”38 The patent disclosed the existence and function of COX-
2, as well as a screening assay for determining whether a screened drug 
displayed the COX-2 selectivity.39 However, the patent did not disclose 
any actual drug possessing the desired COX-2 selectivity, and the patentee 
(Rochester) acquiesced in the defendant’s assertion that no actual drug ex-
isted as of the application filing date.40 The defendant (Searle) challenged 
validity on written description grounds and prevailed on summary judg-
ment before the district court.41 On appeal, Rochester argued that because 
Searle had not introduced any evidence in support of the written descrip-
tion theory, Searle could not as a matter of law overcome the presumption 
of validity.42 However, the Federal Circuit disagreed. According to the 
court, the presumption of validity does not foreclose the possibility that 
“the patent in suit proves its own validity” and Rochester’s patent “clearly 
and convincingly does just that.”43  
Rochester reinforces the proposition developed in the preceding sec-
tion: that the Federal Circuit is capable of changing the overlying message 
delivered by the presumption of validity without changing the language of 
the evidentiary standard. If it becomes de rigueur at the Federal Circuit to 
                                                                                                                                                
 35. Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d, 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(overturning the district court’s fact finding as to the existence of a pre-critical date offer 
as clearly erroneous and thus reversing the district court’s legal conclusion that the patent 
was not invalid for violating the on-sale bar). 
 36. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 37. University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 38. Id. at 918 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6, 048,850 (issued Apr. 11, 2000)).  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 930. 
 41. Id. at 919. 
 42. Id. at 930. 
 43. Id. 
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speak of patents clearly and convincingly proving their own invalidity, 
then, with the passage of time, the overlying message of the presumption 
of validity will change even if the language of the evidentiary standard 
remains constant. 
By analogous reasoning, we should be wary of a reform proposal that 
seeks to effectuate changes in case outcomes simply by changing the lan-
guage of the evidentiary standard. Such a proposal presumes a tight con-
nection between the language of the standard and the outcomes of cases. 
That is, it fixates on the instrumental function of the presumption of valid-
ity to the apparent exclusion of the expressive function. In so doing, it ex-
aggerates the extent to which changes to the language of the presumption 
can be used as a strategy for fine-tuning the patent systems. 
C. Trademark Cases: Experience with the Preponderance 
Standard 
Experience with trademark cases reinforces the point that the words of 
the evidentiary standard and the message associated with a presumption of 
validity may diverge such that case outcomes are very difficult to predict 
based merely on the choice of evidentiary standard. The current regime for 
adjudicating trademark validity resembles the FTC Report’s proposed re-
gime for adjudicating patent validity. The Lanham Act provides a pre-
sumption of validity for marks registered on the Principal Register,44 and a 
number of courts have embraced the preponderance standard as the quan-
tum of evidence required to overcome the presumption. Despite the exis-
tence of a statutory presumption of validity, many courts seem to have 
taken the message that the presumption in trademark cases is to be ignored 
altogether: in many decisions, the presumption either is not mentioned at 
all or is largely trivialized.45 For example, in Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne 
Corp., Tie Tech registered the product configuration trade dress of its 
hand-held welding cutter.46 After a lengthy prosecution, including an ap-
                                                                                                                                                
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2000) (providing that a mark registered on the Principal 
Register “shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark”). 
 45. Courts have held that the presumption only shifts the burden of production to the 
trademark challenger. E.g., Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 
937 (7th Cir. 1986). Also, some courts have held that the presumptions are of the bursting 
bubble variety: where the trademark challenger has met the burden of producing rebuttal 
evidence, the presumptions disappear. Igloo Products Corp. v. Brantex, Inc., 202 F.3d 
814 (5th Cir. 2000); Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337 
(2d Cir. 1999); Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169 (7th Cir. 1996). 
But see Americana Trading, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(rare example of a case calling for a district court to give greater weight to the 
presumptive effect of registration).  
 46. 296 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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peal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the registration issued.47 
One of the principal issues in the prosecution was the functionality of the 
claimed trade dress.48 Tie Tech subsequently sued Kinedyne for the trade 
dress infringement, but Kinedyne won on summary judgment on the 
ground that the registration was invalid for functionality.49 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “the plaintiff in an infringement action 
with a registered mark is given the prima facie or presumptive advantage 
on the issue of validity, thus shifting the burden of production to the de-
fendant to prove otherwise.”50 However, the court made clear that the ef-
fect of the presumption was negligible. According to the court, once the 
presumption of validity was overcome, “the mark’s registration is merely 
evidence ‘of registration,’ nothing more.”51 Thus, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the proposition that the registration “should be treated as something 
of an expert’s affidavit on its validity.”52 Moreover, the court asked very 
little of the defendant in agreeing with the lower court that the defendant 
had overcome the presumption of validity. The defendant merely pre-
sented functionality allegations that likely were the same as those raised 
during the prosecution.53 It is difficult to discern how the existence of the 
registration, and the corresponding presumption, made any material differ-
ence in the case.54 
In other decisions, the presumption and the associated preponderance 
standard is a matter of controversy. For example, in Burke-Parsons-
Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc.,55 the validity issue cen-
tered on whether the mark “APPALACHIAN LOG STRUCTURES” used 
in connection with the construction of log residences was primarily geo-
                                                                                                                                                
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 781-82. 
 50. Id. at 783. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 784. 
 53. See id. at 783 (reciting the three aspects the defendant cited it believed to be 
functional). 
 54. Functionality provides a particularly good illustration. In cases involving 
unregistered trade dress, the Lanham Act expressly assigns to plaintiffs the burden of 
proving non-functionality. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2000). Had Tie Tech involved 
unregistered trade dress, the plaintiff would have been required to produce evidence 
raising a fact issue as to functionality pursuant to discharging its burden of proof. In the 
actual case, the plaintiff was compelled to produce evidence raising a fact issue as to 
functionality pursuant to discharging its burden of coming forward with evidence in 
response to defendant’s allegations. Tie Tech, 296 F.3d at 784-86. In practical terms, it is 
difficult to distinguish between the two.  
 55. 871 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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graphically descriptive, and, if so, whether the mark owner had demon-
strated evidence of secondary meaning.56 In the registration process, the 
trademark examiner requested evidence of secondary meaning, the appli-
cant submitted evidence, and consequently, the examiner acceded to regis-
tration.57 In subsequent litigation, the district court had invalidated the reg-
istration on the grounds that the mark was geographically descriptive and 
the evidence of secondary meaning was insufficient to overcome descrip-
tiveness.58  The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court, stating that while 
the USPTO’s decisions were given deference, the presumption was rebut-
table, and plaintiff’s evidence of secondary meaning was insufficient.59 
However, the remaining judges disagreed as to the effect of the 
presumption. According to Judge Krupansky, in his concurring opinion, 
the presumption did not even shift the ultimate burden of proof from the 
trademark owner.60 Instead, once the trademark challenger introduced evi-
dence rebutting the presumption—which seemed to require little here—the 
ultimate burden of proof, including the heavy burden of proving secondary 
meaning, reverted to the trademark owner.61 In contrast, Judge Guy’s dis-
sent offered a dramatically different view of the effect of the presumption 
of validity. Judge Guy argued that a trademark challenger must submit 
“very persuasive” evidence to overcome the presumption.62 Quoting from 
an old Second Circuit decision,63 Judge Guy asserted that the trademark 
challenger not only bears the burden of going forward to challenge valid-
ity, but also bears the burden of proof. The presumption of validity is 
“strong,” and courts should not “overrule the action of the Patent Office to 
whose care Congress has entrusted the preliminary determination as to 
whether a mark fulfills the requirements of the statute.”64 
In fairness, any confusion that might result from adopting a prepon-
derance standard for patent validity would probably be less severe than 
                                                                                                                                                
 56. Id. at 592-93  
 57. Id.  at 595. 
 58. Id. at 595-96. 
 59. Id. at 596. 
 60. Id. at 597 (Krupansky, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. (Krupansky, J., concurring). 
 62. Id.at 598 (Guy, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 598-99 (Guy., J., dissenting) (quoting Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. 
Season All-Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 316 (2d Cir. 1958)). Illustrating the 
malleability of the preponderance standard, the Second Circuit in Aluminimum was 
evidently applying a preponderance of the evidence standard for overcoming this strong 
presumption of validity. The Second Circuit remarked that in order to prevail, the 
trademark challenger had to “put something more into the scales than the registrant” had 
put into the scales. Aluminum, 259 F.2d at 316. 
 64. Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp., 871 F.2d at 598 (Guy, J., dissenting).  
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that existing in the trademark area. Unlike the Lanham Act provision, 
§ 282 of the Patent Act expressly provides that “[t]he burden of establish-
ing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party assert-
ing such validity.”65 Nonetheless, the point remains that merely changing 
the language of the patent law standard to “preponderance” by no means 
ensures that courts will converge around a uniform approach to assessing 
patent validity evidence. Trademark law suggests that a change to a pre-
ponderance standard may simply inject ambiguity as to the governing 
message that the presumption of patent validity is intended to deliver. This 
would then open the door to a plurality of different approaches to imple-
menting the presumption in individual cases.  
D. Conclusions Regarding the Presumption’s Expressive Function 
In targeting the presumption of validity for reform, perhaps the FTC 
Report chose unwisely. For the reasons detailed above, changing the 
words of the evidentiary standard might make little difference in case out-
comes. At the same time, the overarching message that the presumption of 
validity sends is such a potent indicator of the overall state of the patent 
system that a proposal to alter it might provoke a visceral reaction within 
the patent community that may undercut the credibility of other aspects of 
the FTC patent reform agenda. Moreover, the proposal and the reaction is 
might engender may serve to polarize the debate, activating latent tensions 
between the antitrust and patent communities. It would be highly unfortu-
nate if this proposal, and the reaction to it, diverts attention from other im-
portant proposals for patent reform appearing in the FTC’s Report, such as 
the proposal for post-grant revocation, as discussed in more detail in the 
following part. 
IV. INSTRUMENTAL FUNCTION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF 
VALIDITY 
While typical reform proposals, like those of the FTC Report, overlook 
the expressive quality of the presumption of validity, they do focus con-
siderable attention on the instrumental function of the presumption (and its 
associated clear and convincing standard). The FTC Report’s instrumental 
arguments for changing to a preponderance standard are plausible, but not 
ironclad. 
                                                                                                                                                
 65. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); see also New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton 
Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The presumption acts as a procedural device 
which places the burden of going forward with evidence and the ultimate burden of 
persuasion of invalidity at trial on the alleged infringer.”).  
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The Report’s principal arguments for reforming the presumption of va-
lidity are not expressly instrumentalist, but can be understood in instru-
mental terms. First, the FTC Report argues that the ex parte examination 
scheme has proven to be of only limited effectiveness in discriminating 
between patent-worthy and patent-unworthy inventions, so patentees 
should not enjoy the benefit of “a heightened evidentiary standard” against 
validity challenge in litigation.66 That is, as between the patentee and pat-
ent challenger, the limitations of ex parte practice counsel against insulat-
ing the patentee to such a great extent from the risk of error. Instead, the 
patentee should bear a greater degree of risk of an erroneous judgment as 
to validity.67  
Second, the FTC Report asserts that the clear and convincing standard 
facilitates anticompetitive uses of patents because patentees are embold-
ened in the knowledge that it will be difficult for any challenger to rid the 
marketplace of a “bad” patent68 and, of course, correspondingly difficult to 
make out a claim that the patent litigation was motivated by anticompeti-
tive impulses.69 The FTC’s analysis is thoughtful and its arguments are 
plausible. However, its treatment of the presumption of validity is cursory 
and gives too little attention to at least two complicating factors: (1) the 
interconnections between validity and scope doctrines; and (2) the inter-
                                                                                                                                                
 66. FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 28. 
 67. One weakness of a purely instrumental account of the presumption of validity, at 
least as articulated in the referenced section of the FTC Report, is that it seems to 
encourage an undue focus on allocating risks between the private litigants without 
adequately addressing the risks (or benefits) running to third parties. Some third party 
effects support the FTC’s proposal, but others do not. 
A few simple examples suffice to make the point. Assume that litigation between a 
patentee and a patent challenger results in a correct judgment that a patent is invalid. That 
judgment has preclusive effect against the patentee. As a result, third parties enjoy the 
benefit of operating in the patent-free environment, but only the patent challenger bears 
the risk. Discarding the clear and convincing standard in favor of a preponderance 
standard might seem attractive in such circumstances insofar as it might facilitate the 
patent challenger in acting to rid the marketplace of an invalid patent, to the benefit of 
both the challenger and the public. 
Similarly, assume that litigation results in an erroneous judgment upholding patent 
validity. The patent can be enforced against third parties and may de facto enjoy a 
“strengthened” presumption of validity. Discarding the clear and convincing standard 
again might appeal attractive in such circumstances. 
 68. This argument is facially problematic because it seems to start from the premise 
that everyone can agree on which patents are in fact of “questionable validity,” when 
resolving that issue is, of course, the very point of patent validity litigation. 
 69. For an explanation of the relevant law on allegations of anticompetitive patent 
litigation, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., 1 IP AND ANTITRUST 11-1 to -38 (2001 & 
Supp. 2004). 
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connections between validity litigation and other mechanisms for resolv-
ing validity disputes. 
A. Litigating Validity Versus Litigating Scope 
While the FTC’s arguments are plausible, they suffer from tunnel vi-
sion. Patent validity issues do not exist in isolation from other patent law 
doctrines.70 It is a mistake to suggest changes to patent validity doctrines 
without accounting for the interconnections between validity and other 
doctrines, such as patent scope, especially in light of the fact that the law 
of patent scope has been particularly volatile in the past decade.  
Consider the following possible consequence of adopting the FTC Re-
port’s proposal concerning the presumption of validity. Current conven-
tional wisdom holds that the Federal Circuit is pursuing a policy which 
combines a relatively liberal approach to patent validity (meaning that pat-
ents are perceived as difficult to invalidate) with a relatively restrictive 
approach to patent scope (meaning that patent infringement is perceived as 
being easy to avoid, particularly infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents).71 Such an approach may reflect a view about the appropriate 
balance between giving a fair reward to inventors and giving fair notice to 
the public. Suppose that the Federal Circuit were subjected to a legisla-
tively-imposed change to the evidentiary standard for overcoming the pre-
sumption of validity.72 If a legislative change made it easier for challeng-
ers to invalidate patents, might the Federal Circuit react by restructuring 
its current restrictive approach to patent scope? For example, the court 
might apply the claim construction axiom that courts will construe claims 
                                                                                                                                                
 70. For a few examples consider the connections between validity and claim 
construction, validity and infringement generally, and validity and the limitations on 
equivalency. See, e.g., Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 
882 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that claims are construed consistently for validity and 
infringement); Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(commenting on the symmetry between infringement and validity determinations); 
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 685 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (holding that validity determinations are relevant to an infringement analysis that 
uses the hypothetical claim methodology); see also Johnson & Johnston Assoc., Inc. v. 
R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J., concurring) (discussing 
the interplay between foreseeability as an equivalency concept and obviousness). 
 71. For an acknowledgment of the conventional wisdom and citations to statistical 
studies that may support the conventional wisdom, see, for example, FTC REPORT, supra 
note 2, ch. 5, at 25.  
 72. I recognize that the clear and convincing standard is a judicial creation, and that 
reform proposals contemplate that the Federal Circuit could change to the preponderance 
standard without Congressional intervention. If the Federal Circuit cannot be persuaded 
to change the standard, then presumably reform proposals would advocate that the 
reforms be effectuated through legislative change. 
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so as to preserve their validity, rather than the currently popular counter-
axiom that courts are not entitled to rewrite claims.73 Additionally, the 
Federal Circuit might adjust the verbal formulation for equivalency74 to 
make it easier for patentees to capture infringers under the doctrine of 
equivalents, or the court might relax the doctrine of prosecution history 
estoppel by displaying a greater willingness to find that patentees had 
overcome the Festo presumption.75  
This notion—that action on the presumption of validity might precipi-
tate an equal and opposite reaction in other doctrines, yielding zero net 
momentum—need not be viewed as a prediction of Federal Circuit recalci-
trance or general Federal Circuit peevishness. The Federal Circuit might 
legitimately take the view that it has struck the right balance between va-
lidity and infringement (between reward to the patentee and notice to the 
public), and that sound patent policy would demand a reconsideration of 
the law of claim scope in response to a change in the law of patent valid-
ity. Whether this particular prediction about the Newtonian dynamics of 
patent jurisprudence is accurate is largely beside the point. Policymakers 
should not assume that a change to the presumption of validity will only 
affect validity and will generate no compensating reaction elsewhere in the 
patent system.  
B. The Presumption of Validity as a Channeling Mechanism 
Just as patent validity doctrines do not exist in isolation from other 
patent doctrines, patent litigation as a mechanism for resolving patent va-
lidity disputes does not exist in isolation from other mechanisms for re-
solving patent validity disputes. Those mechanisms are many, including 
private action in the form of license negotiations or formal alternative dis-
pute resolution and administrative action in the form of post-grant revoca-
tion schemes76 or even ex parte examination. Proposals to reform the pre-
sumption of validity seem to focus on how the reforms might change par-
ties’ behavior in litigation, but seem to ignore the prospect that reforms 
                                                                                                                                                
 73. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., 
dissenting in part) (discussing axiom and counter-axiom).  
 74. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 
(1997) (delegating from the Supreme Court to the Federal Circuit authority to establish 
the precise verbal formulation for equivalency). 
 75. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
(2002) (establishing the Festo presumption); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (elaborating on the factors for rebutting 
the Festo presumption), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2018 (2004). 
 76. For a description of such schemes and a detailed proposal to create such a 
scheme in U.S. law, see Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable 
Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997).  
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might change parties’ incentives to resolve validity disputes through 
mechanisms other than litigation.  
The most serious potential impact concerns post-grant administrative 
revocation. All other factors being equal, the FTC Report’s recommenda-
tion concerning the presumption of validity might work at cross-purposes 
with the Report’s very important recommendation to create a post-grant 
revocation system.77 To the extent that the presumption of validity oper-
ates as a channeling mechanism, directing validity disputes towards or 
away from the courts, the proposal to discard the clear and convincing 
standard may encourage patent challengers to resolve validity disputes in 
court and correlatively discourage use of any newly-created administrative 
revocation scheme. 
This result would be a serious step backwards. As compared to validity 
litigation, well-designed post-grant revocation schemes offer the promise 
of quicker, cheaper resolution of patent validity disputes.78 While the Re-
port argues that post-grant revocation is desirable because it reduces the 
private costs of challenging validity,79 a more ambitious claim can be 
made: such a system might reduce overall private costs of litigating valid-
ity—meaning private costs incurred by both the challenger and the pat-
entee—if such a system diverts validity disputes away from the courts, 
which are more expensive fora for both parties. If the facts bear this claim 
out, we should retain a robust presumption of validity, exactly the opposite 
of the FTC Report’s proposal. 
Unfortunately, we have little experience so far with the use of the pre-
sumption of validity as a channeling device between roughly equivalent, 
alternative fora for resolving validity disputes. For example, under current 
law, the clear and convincing standard applies in litigation but not in reex-
amination.80 If all other factors were equal—if litigation and reexamina-
tion were roughly equivalent fora for resolving validity disputes—we 
would expect that this combination of evidentiary standards would chan-
nel patent challengers away from litigation and towards reexamination. 
This outcome has not occurred; from the patent challenger’s perspective, 
even inter partes reexamination is not a rough substitute for litigation.81  
                                                                                                                                                
 77. For the FTC’s recommendation concerning post-grant administrative revocation, 
see FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 5, at 15-24. 
 78. Id. at 20. Of course, one should not underestimate the difficulty of designing a 
revocation system well. 
 79. Id. 
 80. For a discussion of relevant precedent, see Janis, supra note 76, at 63-69.  
81. For a discussion of the reasons, see Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Reexamination, 
10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481 (2000). 
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The concept of the presumption and the evidentiary standard as chan-
neling devices deserves more attention in policy debates over the instru-
mental function of the presumption of validity.82 In addition, the concept 
ties in with a larger scholarly debate over the appropriate allocation of re-
sponsibility among institutions of the patent system for deciding closely 
contested questions of patentability. In that larger debate, Professor Lem-
ley has argued that the ex parte examination scheme is best designed to 
provide a quick look at patentability, so that we should push close ques-
tions of patentability forward to another system that is better suited to re-
solve contested issues.83 The companion argument to Professor Lemley’s 
view is that validity litigation is an expensive and cumbersome mechanism 
for resolving patent validity, so that we should push at least some close 
questions of patentability backwards to another system that is capable of 
resolving contested issues, even if that other system lacks all of the trap-
pings of litigation. Both arguments highlight the importance of creating an 
intermediate space between the ex parte system and litigation, such as a 
post-grant revocation scheme, and of also creating procedural mechanisms 
that move disputes towards that intermediate space. A thoughtfully-
designed presumption of validity is one such mechanism. 
A key task for future patent policymakers is to arrive at a thoughtful 
design, one that achieves an optimal blend of ex parte examination, ad-
ministrative revocation, and litigation for resolving validity disputes. 
There is currently no clear choice among many alternatives. I have sug-
gested in this Article that the merits of the current clear and convincing 
standard as compared to the preponderance standard, but neither I nor 
anyone else would claim that the current standard has been an unalloyed 
success. Professor Rai has suggested that the clear and convincing stan-
dard might be restricted to patents that have survived post-grant revocation 
proceedings, but has acknowledged that this scheme might disadvantage 
truly pioneering inventions because such inventions might be so remote 
from the prior art that no one would see fit to bring a post-grant revoca-
tion.84 Others have suggested that the Federal Circuit return to the rule that 
                                                                                                                                                
 82. The concept also has implications for another of the FTC Report’s arguments, 
namely that the USPTO uses a preponderance standard in ex parte examination and thus, 
the courts should also use the same standard in validity litigation. FTC REPORT, supra 
note 2, ch. 5, at 28. This equivalency in standards is certainly not required, nor even 
necessarily desirable, if the presumption is being used deliberately to channel disputes 
either towards or away from the courts. 
 83. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1508-11 (2001). 
 84. See Arti Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to 
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003). 
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the clear and convincing standard applies only to litigation challenges that 
are based on prior art that the USPTO has already considered, but not as to 
challenges based on other prior art.85  
This proposal that the clear and convincing standard only apply to the 
considered prior art raises a number of questions. First, what does it mean 
for the USPTO to “consider” prior art? Does it mean that there is actual 
evidence that the examiner studied and applied the reference or does it 
merely mean that the examiner completed the ministerial steps necessary 
to allow the prior art to be listed on the front page of the patent? Second, 
would a return to this rule merely encourage parties to submit more volu-
minous information disclosure statements, adding to examiners’ work-
loads and decreasing the available time that an examiner can spend study-
ing any given prior art reference? Third, despite Federal Circuit statements 
to the contrary, do courts today de facto withhold the clear and convincing 
standard when the challenger presents prior art that the USPTO has never 
considered? 
My goal in this Article is not to select a clear winner from among these 
alternatives. Rather, my goal is to point out that the presumption of valid-
ity, even when viewed solely in instrumental terms, can play a significant 
role in mediating between alternative fora for resolving patent validity 
questions. Reform proposals concerning the presumption of validity 
should take this role more seriously. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Some eighty years ago, in Radio Corp. v. Radio Engineering Labora-
tories, Inc., Justice Cardozo wrote perceptively about the presumption of 
patent validity.86 Although his opinion preceded the codification of the 
                                                                                                                                                
 85. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1575, 1660 (2003); Charles E. Phipps, The Presumption of Administrative 
Correctness: The Proper Basis for the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 10 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 143 (2000). For another variation, see Clarence J. Fleming, Should the Clear 
and Convincing Standard for Rebutting the Presumption of Validity Apply When the 
Challenger Raises a Substantial New Question of Patentability?, 80 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 146 (1998) (proposing a legislative change to § 282 that would 
specify that the preponderance standard applies when the challenger raises a substantial 
new question of patentablility). The “substantial new question” standard appears in 
current reexamination provisions. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). It has a dismal history, in 
which the USPTO has used the standard to find a substantial new question almost as a 
matter of routine. The standard has never proven capable of facilitating finely-calibrated 
judgments distinguishing between worthy and frivolous challenges to patentability and 
would likely result in the use of the preponderance standard in nearly all litigated cases. 
86. 293 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1934) (internal citations omitted). 
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presumption of validity in the 1952 Act,87 his words are still relevant to-
day:  
A patent regularly issued, and even more obviously a patent is-
sued after a hearing of all the rival claimants, is presumed to be 
valid until the presumption has been overcome by convincing 
evidence of error. The force of that presumption has found vary-
ing expression in this and other courts. Sometimes it is said that 
in a suit for infringement, when the defense is a prior invention, 
“the burden of proof to make good this defense” is “upon the 
party setting it up,” and “every reasonable doubt should be re-
solved against him.” Again it is said that :the presumption of the 
validity of the patent is such that the defense of invention by an-
other must be established by the clearest proof—perhaps beyond 
reasonable doubt.” The context suggests that in these and like 
phrases the courts were not defining a standard in terms of scien-
tific accuracy or literal precision, but were offering counsel and 
suggestion to guide the course of judgment. Through all the ver-
bal variances, however, there runs this common core of thought 
and truth, that one otherwise an infringer who assails the validity 
of a patent fair upon its face bears a heavy burden of persuasion, 
and fails unless his evidence has more than a dubious preponder-
ance.88 
In response to the FTC’s proposal, I am dubious about the preponder-
ance. The FTC has not made its case for altering the standards associated 
with the presumption of patent validity, either by a clear and convincing 
evidence standard or even by a preponderance. The presumption of patent 
validity is as much a malleable expression of ambitions as it is an instru-
ment of precise calibration. Reform proposals should bear in mind the pre-
sumption’s dual character as both expression and policy tool.  
                                                                                                                                                
 87. Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 729 (1952) (codified as amended in 35 
U.S.C.) 
88. Radio Corp., 293 U.S. at 7-8. 
